逻辑基础问题

内容简介

《逻辑基础问题》为逻辑提出了一个全面系统的新基础。

众所周知，为逻辑构建一个系统的哲学基础是一个异常困难的问题。本书认为解决这个问题的关键在于方法论。人们普遍认为，逻辑的基础必须采用传统的基础方法论即基础主义。不过，这一方法论在原则上不能为基础学科提供基础。这就使得哲学家完全放弃去为逻辑构造一个基础。但是，基础主义不是唯一合理的基础方法论。本书提出基础整体主义作为替换的方法论。基础整体主义将强烈的基础性要求与整体主义工具结合，为逻辑建立了一个可行的、系统的基础。

本书运用这一新的方法论为逻辑描绘了一个实际基础，其出发点是逻辑在人类知识中所起的作用，即提供一个普遍的、特别强有力的推理或后承方法，尤其是，逻辑后承必须保证真在前提到结论的传递，而这一保证必须具有一种特别强的模态力量。为了起到这样的作用，逻辑必须满足各种坚定的真实性要求，为此，它必须建基于人类心灵和世界之中。但是，逻辑又不能建基于世界的任意事物之中，它必须建基在足以强大到为关于逻辑后承的要求提供基础的世界方面。本书把逻辑建基于支配世界的、特别强的法则——即形式法则——之中而解决了这个问题。由于这些法则的特性——特别强的不变性度，形式法则具有强大的模态力量，它们具有了所要求的必然性，从而可以为逻辑后承提供基础。本书为形式性提供了一个标准，这个标准使得逻辑常项成为逻辑真和逻辑后承的“引擎”。

书中还进一步解释了新基础如何保证必然性，不仅如此，也对它如何保证逻辑的其他典型特征有所解释：普遍性、主题中立性、强规范性以及（准）先天性。书中讨论了逻辑中的错误和修正，并且对逻辑性标准的批评也进行回应。本书最后考察的是逻辑与数学之间的关系，提出了一个弗雷格式的逻辑主义。逻辑主义把数学建基在逻辑之中，但它无法为逻辑提供基础。通过把数学和逻辑都建基于形式之中，这一问题在本书建立的基础中不再出现。这样的新基础就可以解释清楚逻辑与数学之间的联系和区别，即二者之间的劳动分工与合作。

The Question of the Foundations of Logic proposes a comprehensive and systematic new basis for logic. As we all know, building a systematic philosophical basis for logic is an exceptionally difficult problem. This book argues that the key to solving this problem lies in methodology. It is generally accepted that the basis of logic must adopt the traditional foundational methodology, that is, foundationalism. However, this methodology cannot provide a basis for basic disciplines in principle. This leads the philosopher to abandon altogether the construction of a foundation for logic. However, foundationalism is not the only rational foundational methodology. This book presents basic holism as an alternative methodology. Fundamental holism combines strong foundational requirements with holistic tools to establish a viable, systematic foundation for logic. This book uses this new methodology to provide a practical basis for logic, starting from the role of logic in human knowledge, that is, to provide a universal and particularly powerful method of reasoning or consequentiation, especially that logical consequential must guarantee the transmission of the conclusion that is really mentioned earlier, and this guarantee must have a particularly strong modal force. In order to do so, logic must meet firm requirements for authenticity, and for this it must be based on the human mind and the world. But logic cannot be based on anything in the world, it must be based on the world strong enough to provide a basis for the requirements of logical succession. This book solves this problem by basing logic on a particularly strong law that governs the world—the law of form. Because of the characteristics of these laws, which are particularly strong degrees of invariance, formal laws have a strong modal force, and they have the required necessity and thus provide the basis for logical succession. This book provides a criterion for formality that makes logical constants the "engine" of logical truth and logical successors. It further explains how the new foundation guarantees inevitability, not only that, but also how it guarantees other typical features of logic: universality, thematic neutrality, strong normativity, and (quasi) innateness. Errors and corrections in logic are discussed, and criticisms of logical standards are also responded. The book concludes with an examination of the relationship between logic and mathematics, proposing a Frey-style logicism. Logicism bases mathematics on logic, but it cannot provide a basis for logic. By basing both mathematics and logic on form, this problem no longer arises in the foundation on which this book is built. Such a new foundation can explain the connection and difference between logic and mathematics, that is, the division of labor and cooperation between the two.

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