For a long time, China has implemented a dual land system of urban-rural separation, and rural collective construction land has been prohibited from being listed and transferred. Since the implementation of the paid term system for the right to the use of state-owned land in the 80s of the 20th century, the government has obtained high land revenues through the expropriation of rural collective land, the transfer of state-owned land, land taxation, etc., forming a unique phenomenon of "land finance" in China. With the acceleration of urbanization, the speed and scale of land assetization continue to expand. According to statistics, from 2001 to 2016, the total income from land transfer in the country reached more than 30 trillion yuan, becoming the main source of local finance. The "dual-track" system of land use and price has solidified and continuously strengthened "land finance", which has led to damage to the land property rights of rural collective land owners and farmers, and hindered the development of rural economy. If this situation is not changed, it will further exacerbate urban and rural inequalities and slow down China's new urbanization process. I. The reform of rural collective operation construction land entering the market and the distribution of income began with the market-oriented reform in the 80s of the 20th century, which promoted the spontaneous exploration of collective construction land in economically developed areas such as Nanhai City (now Nanhai District of Foshan City) and Zhongshan City in Guangdong Province; From the 90s of the 20th century to 2014, China was the most active period in exploring the circulation of rural collective construction land, and representative places such as Suzhou, Wuhu, Shunde District of Foshan City, Nanhai District and other places achieved certain results in system construction, land income distribution, protection of rural collective economic organizations and farmers' land property rights, and promotion of rural urbanization and industrialization, providing useful experience for the reform of 15 pilot areas in 2015. (1) Basic results of the reform of entering the market in the national pilot areas Since June 2015, each pilot area has broken through the restrictions of the current law and tried to implement the reform of collective operation construction land entering the market, mainly adopting three entry paths: "local entry into the market, industrial concentration area (adjusted to enter the market), and urban villages entering the market". According to incomplete statistics, from August 2015 to June 2016, a total of 420,000 square meters of construction land for collective operation were transferred. Its main achievements are: (1) The initial construction of a unified urban and rural construction land market. First, pilot areas have established a unified urban and rural construction land trading platform, such as Deqing in Zhejiang and Pixian in Chengdu City, which include collectively operated construction land into a unified public resource trading center for trading; Foshan Nanhai District is included in the collective property rights trading center for trading; Other pilot areas are included in the Land Exchange Centre for trading. The second is to grant the same property rights as state-owned land. Construction land for collective operation in pilot areas can be transferred, leased, transferred, and purchased as shares at a price, and more importantly, the right of mortgage guarantee for construction land for collective operation is granted. Third, a land price system for construction land for collective operation has been initially established, and the "same right and same price" as state-owned land has been initially realized. The pilot areas have graded the construction land for collective operation, and formulated a benchmark land price, which provides a price basis for the market transaction of construction land for collective operation. (2) The land income distribution mechanism shared by the state, local governments, collectives and individual farmers was preliminarily constructed. First, the pilot areas have basically implemented on a trial basis the adjustment fee for land value-added income levied "according to category, use, and gradation". Second, the focus of land revenue distribution is tilted towards collective economic organizations and their members. Third, it clarifies the use and distribution methods of collective land revenues. The income obtained by rural collectives is mainly used for the construction of rural infrastructure and public facilities, as well as the social security of farmers. For members of collective organizations, a combination of cash distribution and equity quantification or all quantification of equity is adopted to distribute equity to farmers. (2) The main problems in the distribution of income from the circulation of construction land for collective operation at present are: (1) The ownership subject of rural collective land is not clear, and the main body of land income distribution is ambiguous. In the pilot areas, some of them are specific entities to enter the market by forming collective shareholding economic cooperatives (village economic cooperatives), township (town) asset management companies or farmers' collective economic associations with legal personality; Land rights are exercised partly through villagers' groups, village committees, and township governments. These practices confuse the boundaries between land ownership, administrative management rights (or villagers' autonomous organizations) and land property rights management rights, and in fact cause the absence and "virtual transformation" of land ownership subjects. (2) The land revenue distribution method and distribution mechanism are not perfect. First, the policy of internal income distribution of land circulation lacks effective institutional arrangements. From the perspective of the current pilot areas, the distribution methods mainly include: the income from entering the market is quantified to the members of the collective economic organization as a collective asset, and no cash distribution is carried out, such as Deqing County in Zhejiang and Nanhai District in Foshan; Adopt a combination of cash distribution and equity quantification to members of collective economic organizations, such as Pi County, Chengdu; Direct distribution of cash to members of collective economic organizations, such as Dazu District of Chongqing. Second, in the process of land value-added income distribution, the government levies a certain proportion of the total land transaction price, rather than the net income after deducting the cost of land transfer or circulation, which lacks rationality and scientificity, and may also lead to damage to the interests of rural collective economic organizations and peasants' land property. 2. The distribution of state-owned land revenue Due to the dual land structure divided between urban and rural areas and the institutional arrangement of the dual-track land price system, the government monopolizes the primary land market, and the local government's large-scale land sales contain both institutional and economic factors, forming a unique phenomenon of "land finance" and "lack of local main tax" in China. (1) The distribution of proceeds from the sale of state-owned land The main problems of the proceeds from the sale of state-owned land are: (1) The income from the sale of state-owned land is alienated into the "second finance" of local governments. According to statistics, from 2001 to 2015, China's state-owned land transfer income reached more than 27 trillion yuan, and the proportion of state-owned land transfer income in local financial general budget revenue was high, and the average proportion of local financial general budget revenue in the six years from 2010 to 2015 was 55.30%, and the highest year reached 66.76% (2010) 1764875. (2) Local debt is highly dependent on land transfer income. In order to improve urban infrastructure and develop the local economy, local governments have borrowed a lot of money to raise funds, and the income from the sale of state-owned land has become the main source of funds for local governments to repay debts. (3) The problem of state-owned land mortgage financing is prominent. According to statistics, the land mortgage area in 84 key cities increased from 130,100 hectares in 2007 to 490,800 hectares in 2015, an increase of 3.77 times; mortgage loans increased from 1,343.3 billion yuan in 2007 to 1,1330 billion 1764876 yuan in 2015, an increase of 8.43 times. Land mortgages face greater debt repayment risks and local fiscal risks. (2) The main problems in land (real estate) taxation are: (1) The scope of taxation is small and the tax base is narrow. It is mainly levied on the right to the use of state-owned land and urban real estate in cities and towns, and does not levy land (real estate) tax on rural collective land and rural real estate; Only operating land (real estate) is taxed, and non-operating land (real estate) is not taxed; The tax rate is low and the scope of tax reduction and exemption is too broad. (2) The structure of the tax system is unreasonable, emphasizing "circulation" and "retention". The proportion of real estate ownership tax is low, accounting for only about 21% of the total real estate tax revenue. (3) The proportion of real estate tax in the general budget revenue of local finance is low. At present, the total real estate tax revenue accounts for about 25% of the general budget revenue of local finance; The share of real estate property tax is even lower, about 4.5%-5%. 3. China's land revenue distribution policy selection Land revenue distribution issues involve multi-level land property rights and land revenue allocation issues such as collective land ownership, usufruct rights, and management rights, and involve the distribution and redistribution of economic benefits between the state, collective land owners, land usufruct rights holders and diversified property rights holders, which is the key to land system reform and innovation. (1) Policies for the distribution of income from the circulation of construction land for collective operation (1) Effectively solve the problem of membership qualifications of rural collective economic organizations and protect peasants' land and property rights. Only when rural villagers have the qualifications of rural collective membership can they enjoy the right to distribute rural collective land property rights. We believe that the membership of rural collectives should be determined on the basis of the starting point of the reform of rural collective property rights (or the reform of collective construction land entering the market). (2) The focus of land income distribution is tilted towards collective economic organizations and members. (3) Establish a revenue sharing mechanism for the circulation of collective operation construction land that takes into account fairness and efficiency. The state regulates distribution by levying land value-added tax and turnover income tax; Collective economic organizations take a certain proportion of the initial circulation income as collective assets, and set up a collective land revenue fund, which is specially used for rural public goods input and farmers' social security expenditure, so as to promote the sustainable development of rural economy; The remaining part is distributed to farmers by combining equity and cash distribution, and the specific proportion is determined by each locality according to the actual situation. (2) Policy on the distribution of state-owned land revenue (1) Standardize the revenue and expenditure of state-owned land transfer, and implement fund budget management. First, the income from the sale of state-owned land is included in the budget management of government funds, making it an important part of local public finance. The second is to reform the current practice of allocating funds for agricultural land development, affordable housing construction, farmland water conservancy construction, education, and security funds for peasants whose land has been expropriated from the net income from the income from the sale of state-owned land, and change it to a unified calculation based on the total income from the transfer of state-owned land, so as to prevent local governments from arbitrarily reducing the provision of special funds, ensure the supply of public goods for people's livelihood, and meet the basic needs of people's livelihood. (2) Establish state-owned land revenue funds at the central, provincial and county (city) levels. (3) Implement the sharing of income from the transfer of state-owned land between the central and local governments. According to Chinese law, the owner of state-owned land is the central government, and the central government authorizes local governments to exercise land ownership, which is a kind of entrusted agency right, and the central government's sharing of the income from the transfer of state-owned land is a manifestation of the economic realization of state-owned land ownership. Of course, because the land is immovable and the benefits are local, the vast majority of the income from the sale of state-owned land should go to local governments. The specific sharing ratio is determined according to the level of regional economic development and the needs of national macro-management, and the sharing ratio in the central and western regions should be higher than that in the developed eastern regions, so as to support the economic development of the central and western regions, so as to gradually achieve the balanced development of the regional economy. (4) Give local governments the right to issue land bonds secured by land assets. The funds raised through the issuance of land bonds are mainly used for land acquisition, land development and consolidation, local infrastructure construction and public supporting facilities construction. Land bonds are mainly long-term bonds, the maturity of which can be set at 5-10 years, with a fixed coupon rate, annual interest payments, and principal repayment at maturity; Or give priority to exchanging the bonds held for the right to use state-owned construction land for a certain period of time. Local governments determine the issuance price of land bonds based on land market prices and price indexes. (3) Land (real estate) tax reform policy suggestions (1) Expand the scope of taxation and implement a unified urban and rural land (real estate) tax system. All construction land and real estate will be included in the scope of taxation, the scope of tax exemptions and exemptions will be strictly controlled, and a unified urban and rural land (real estate) tax system with fair tax burden and improved efficiency will be gradually established. (2) Simplify taxes and improve the land (real estate) tax system. The first is to merge the urban land use tax, cultivated land occupation tax, land deed tax, and real estate tax, and replace it with real estate property tax; the second is to set up a land idle tax; The third is to improve the land value-added tax system and implement a unified urban and rural land value-added tax. Change the adjustment fee for land appreciation income of collective operation construction land currently levied to land value-added tax; The scope of taxation shall be extended to all acts that cause land appreciation, and all land appreciation gains shall be included in the scope of taxation. The existing VAT on land (real estate) transfer will be adjusted to three tax items: "VAT on land (real estate) transfer", "VAT on land (real estate) lease" and "VAT on land (real estate) ownership". (3) Optimize the structure of the land (real estate) tax system. Adjust the focus of taxation from the land (real estate) circulation link to the land (real estate) ownership link, cultivate the real estate property tax into the main tax of the county (city) local government, and gradually increase the tax burden of the real estate ownership link to about 50% of the real estate tax revenue, so as to provide an institutional basis for the elimination of "land finance".（AI翻译）