中国地方政府公共物品供给研究：以非正式制度为视角

内容简介

对于转型期中国地方政府行为的研究，现有文献日益重视正式制度对官员行为的激励和约束作用：以GDP为标尺的相对绩效考核制度是改革开放后中国经济成功的决定因素，同时该正式制度也是地方政府忽视公共物品供给的重要原因。即使在考虑了正式制度及社会经济因素之后，本研究仍然观察到地方政府在公共物品供给水平上存在着显著的地区和时间差异。然而，对于此差异背后的决定因素，现有文献却考察不足。本书认为，非正式制度是造成该差异的原因。通过采用地区领导人籍贯作为非正式制度的代理并利用1990年至2010年的中国地级市数据，本研究系统检验了上述假设。

For the study of local government behavior in China during the transition period, the existing literature pays more and more attention to the incentive and constraint role of the formal system on the behavior of officials: the relative performance appraisal system with GDP as the yardstick is the determinant of China's economic success after the reform and opening up, and the formal system is also an important reason why local governments neglect the supply of public goods. Even after accounting for formal institutions and socioeconomic factors, the book observes significant regional and temporal differences in the level of local government provision of public goods. However, the existing literature has underexamined the determinants behind this difference. This book argues that informal systems are responsible for this discrepancy. This book systematically tests these hypotheses by using the origins of regional leaders as agents of the informal system and using data from China's prefecture-level cities from 1990 to 2010. The book finds that officials serving in their home areas have a greater incentive to provide public services to their regions than local leaders from other places: local leaders spend significantly more on basic education, public health care, and environmental protection than leaders from outside their home countries. The book also finds that the increase in the share of public service spending has come at the expense of infrastructure: local officials contribute significantly less to this expenditure than foreign officials. At the same time, using provincial data and the same model settings, this study also finds that the informal system still plays a role in provincial administrative units, but to a lesser extent. These findings highlight that in an environment dominated by formal institutions, informal institutions still play a significant role and compensate for the former's shortcomings to some extent. Based on the empirical findings, this book further examines the mechanisms by which informal systems work through case studies and interviews. By analyzing the behavior of local leaders in two prefecture-level cities to vigorously develop livelihood projects and the perceptions of ordinary people about local and foreign officials, this book details the mechanisms by which the informal system influences the behavior of officials, thus providing evidence for the causal mechanisms revealed by the empirical analysis. The book argues that the reason for this difference is that local officials are more embedded in local networks than foreign officials, and they are more invested in livelihood projects out of respect for themselves and their family's prestige in their hometowns. This book's examination of informal institutions and the interaction between the two institutions highlights the institutional dynamics that enrich the behavior of officials within countries in transition.（AI翻译）

作者简介

王芳:（著）

王芳，讲师，2012年毕业于香港中文大学，获政治与行政学博士学位。自2012年9月开始在华东师范大学公共管理学院任教，开设《当代中国政府与政治》、《比较政府与政治》等课程。

参考文献

英文文献

Axelrod Robert,1986,“An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,”The American Political Science Review,Vol.80,No.4（Dec.1986）,pp.1095-1111.

Bian Yanjie,1997,“Bringing Strong Ties Back in:Indirect Ties,Network Bridges,and Job Searches in China,”American Sociological Review 62（3）:366-385.

Blanchard Olivier and Andrei Shleifer,2001,“Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia,”IMF Staff Papers,Palgrave Macmillan Journals 48（4）.

Bo Zhiyue,2002,Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949,Armonk,N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe.

Boix Carles,2001,“Democracy,Development,and the Public Sector,”American Journal of Political Science 45（1）:1-17.

Bratton Michael,2007,“Formal versus Informal Institutions in Africa,”Journal of Democracy 18（3）:96-110.

Brown David S.and Wendy Hunter,1999,“Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America,1980-1992,”The American Political Science Review 93（4）:779-790.

Burgess Robin,R′emi Jedwab,Edward Miguel,and Ameet Morjaria,2009,“Our Turn To Eat:The Political Economy of Roads in Ken ya,”Working paper.

Carey John M.,2000,“Parchment,Equilibria,and Institutions,”Comparative Political Studies 33（6-7）:735-761.

Chen Jie and Narisong Huhe,2010,“Social Networks,Informal Accountability,and Public Goods Provision in Rural China:A Reassessment,”SSRN eLibrary.

Chen Ping,1993,“Chinas Challenge to Economic Orthodoxy:Asian Reform as an Evolutionary,Self-Organizing Process,”China Economic Review 4（2）:137-142.

Ciarleglio Matthew,2008,“Predicting State Allocation of Funds:The Case of John Rowland and his Hometown of Waterbury,Connecticut,”University of Connecticut.

Cox Gary W.and Mathew D.McCubbins,1986,“Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game,”The Journal of Politics 48（2）:370-389.

Crawford Sue E.S.,and Elinor Ostrom,1995,“A Grammar of Institutions,”The American Political Science Review 89（3）:582—600.

Deacon Robert,2009,“Public Good Provision under Dictatorship and Democracy,”Public Choice 139（1）:241-262.

Dittmer L.,H.Fukui and P.N.S.Lee,2000,Informal politics in East Asia,Cambridge University Press.

Dittmer Lowell and Lu Xiaobo,1996,“Personal Politics in the Chinese Danwei under Reform,”Asian Survey 36（3）:246-267.

Dittmer Lowell,and Xiaobo Lu,1996,“Personal Politics in the Chinese Danwei under Reform,”Asian Survey 36（3）:246-267.

Dittmer Lowell,1995,“Chinese Informal Politics,”The China Journal 34:1-34.

Dixit Avinash and John Londregan,1996,“The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics,”The Journal of Politics 58（4）:1132-1155.

Edin Maria,2003,“State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective,”The China Quarterly（173）:35-52.

Ellickson Robert C.,1991,Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes,Mass.:Harvard University Press.

Fearon James D.,Kimuli Kasara and David D.Laitin,2007,“Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset,”American Political Science Review 101（01）:187-193.

Franck Raphaël and Ilia Rainer,2012,“Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter?Ethnic Favoritism,Education and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa,”American Political Science Review 106: 294-325.

Freedman Maurice,1965,Lineage Organization in Southeastern China,London:University Athlone Press.

Freedman Maurice,1966,Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung,New York:Humaniies Press.

Gernet Jacques,1968,Ancient China from the beginnings to the Empire,University of California Press.

Goode W.J,1979,The Celebration of Heroes: Prestige as a Control System,University of California Press.

Guo Gang,2009,“China´s Local Political Budget Cycles,”American Journal of Political Science 53（3）:621-632.

Guo Xuezhi,2001,“Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics,”The China Journal 46:69-90.

Kung James Kai-sing,and Shuo Chen,2011,“The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China´s Great Leap Famine,”American Political Science Review 105:27-45.

Harasymiw Bohdan,1969,“Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party´s Leadership Recruitment System,”Canadian Journal of Political Science 2（4）:493-512.

Helmke G.and S.Levitsky,2006,Informal Institutions and De-mocracy:Lessons from Latin America,Johns Hopkins University Press.

Helmke Gretchen and Steven Levitsky,2004,“Informal Institu-tions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,”Perspectives on Politics 2（04）:725-740.

Huang Yasheng,1995,“Administrative Monitoring in China,”The China Quarterly 143:828-843.

Huang Yasheng,2002,“Managing Chinese Bureaucrats:An Institutional Economics Perspective,”Political Studies 50:61-79.

Knight Jack,1992,Institutions and Social Conflict,New York:Cambridge University Press.

La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A Shleifer,and R Vishny,1999,“The Quality of Government,”Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization 15（1）:222-279.

Lake David A.,and Matthew A.Baum,2001,“The Invisible Hand of Democracy,”Comparative Political Studies 34（6）:587-621.

Landry Pierre F.,2008,Decentralized Authoritarianism in China:the Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era,Cambridge University Press.

Lattimore Owen,1937,“Origins of the Great Wall of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory and Practice,”Geographical Review 27（4）:529-549.

Li David D.,1998,“Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy,”The American Economic Review 88（2）:393-397.

Li Hongbin,and Li-An Zhou,2005,“Political Turnover and E conomic Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,”Journal of Public Economics 89（9-10）:1743-1762.

Manion Melanie,1985,“The Cadre Management System,Post-Mao:the Appointment,Promotion,Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders,”The China Quarterly 102:203-233.

Maskin Eric,Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu,2000,“Incentives,Information,and Organizational Form,”Review of Economic Studies 67（2）:359-378.

Moncrieffe Joy Marie,1998,“Reconceptualizing Political Accountability,”International Political Science Review 19（4）:387—406.

Montinola Gabriella,Yingyi Qian and Barry R.Weingast,1995,“Federalism,Chinese Style:The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,”World Politics 48:50-81.

Moser Christine,2008,“Poverty Reduction,Patronage,or Vote Buying?The Allocation of Public Goods and the 2001 Election in Madagascar,”Economic Development and Cultural Change 57（1）:137-162.

Nathan Andrew J.,1973,“A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,”The China Quarterly 53:34-66.

Nee Victor and Shijin Su,1996,“Institutions,Social Ties,and Commitment in China´s Corporatist Transformation,”In Reforming Asian Socialism: the Growth of Market Institutions,eds.John McMillan and Barry Naughton.Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press.

Nguyen Kieu-Trang,Quoc-Anh Do and Anh Tran,2011,“One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy,”Working paper.

North Douglass C.,1990,Institutions,Institutional Change,and Economic Performance,New York:Cambridge University Press

North Douglass C.,1991,“Institutions,”The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5（1）: 97-112.

O′Brien Kevin J.and Lianjiang Li,1999,“Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,”Comparative Politics 31（2）:167-186.

O'Donnell Guillermo,1996,“Illusions about Consolidation,”Journal of Democracy 7（2）:34-51.

Oi Jean C,1985,“Communism and Clientelism:Rural Politics in China,”World Politics 37（2）:238-266.

Olson Mancur,1993,“Dictatorship,Democracy,and Development,”The American Political Science Review 87（3）:567-576.

Pejovich Svetozar,1999,“The Effects of the Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions on Social Stability and Economic Development,”Journal of Markets & Morality 2（2）: 164-181.

Peng Yusheng,2004,“Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China' s Transitional Economy,”American Journal of Sociology 109（5）:1045-1074.

Peng Yusheng,2010,“When Formal Laws and Informal Norms Collide:Lineage Networks versus Birth Control Policy in China,”American Journal of Sociology 116（3）:770-805.

Persson Petra and Ekaterina V.Zhuravskaya,2011,“Elite Capture in the Absence of Democracy: Evidence from Backgrounds of Chinese Provincial Leaders,”SSRN eLibrary.

Qian Yingyi and Chenggang Xu,1993,“Why China´s economic reforms differ:the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector,”Economics of Transition 1:135–170.

Qian Yingyi and Barry R.Weingast,1996,“China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism,Chinese Style,”Journal of Policy Reform 1:149-185.

Qian Yingyi and Gérard Roland,1998,“Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint,”American Economic Review: December 1998,88（5）:1143—1162.

Qian Yingyi,2002,“How Reform Worked in China,”William Davidson Institute Working Paper: Number 473.

Riches David,1984,“Hunting,Herding and Potlatching: Towards a Sociological Account of Prestige,”Man 19（2）:234-251.

Ross Michael,2006,“Is Democracy Good for the Poor?”American Journal of Political Science 50（4）:860-874.

Saich Tony,2002,“The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analysing the Local State in China,”In East Asian Capitalism: Conflicts,Growth and Crisis,ed.Tomba Luigi,Milano:Feltrinelli.

Sheng Yumin,2005,“Central-Provincial Relations at the CCP Central Committees: Institutions,Measurement and Empirical Trends,1978-2002,”The China Quarterly 182:338-355.

Shirk Susan L.,1994,How China Opened Its Door: the Political Success of the PRC's Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution.

Shleifer Andrei and Treisman Daniel,1999,Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia,Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Stasavage David,2005,“Democracy and Education Spending in Africa,”American Journal of Political Science 49（2）:343-358.

Treisman Daniel,1999,After the Deluge:Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia,Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Tsai Lily L.,2002,“Cadres,Temple and Lineage Institutions,and Governance in Rural China,”The China Journal 48:1-27.

Tsai Lily L.,2007,Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China,Cambridge University Press.

Tsai Lily L.,2007,“Solidary Groups,Informal Accountability,and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China,”American Political Science Review 101（02）:355-372.

Tsou Tang,1976,“Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics,”The China Quarterly 65:98-117.

Tsui Kai-yuen and Youqiang Wang,2004,“Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu:Fiscal Decentralization in China,”The China Quarterly 177:71-90.

Wang Hongying,2000,“Informal Institutions and Foreign Investment in China,”The Pacific Review 13（4）:525-556.

Watson James L.,1982,“Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives On Historical Research,”The China Quarterly 92:589-622.

West Loraine A.and Christine P.W.Wong,1995,“Fiscal Decentralization and Growing Regional Disparities in Rural China: Some Evidence in the Provision of Social Services,”Oxford Review of Economic Policy 11（4）:70-84.

Whiting Susan H.,2001,Power and Wealth in Rural China:The Political Economy of Institutional Change,Cambridge University Press.

Wittfogel Karl,1967,Oriental Despotism:A Comparative Study of Total Power,Yale University Press.

Xin Katherine R.and Jone L.Pearce,1996,“Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional Support,”The Academy of Management Journal 39（6）:1641-1658.

Xu Chenggang and Juzhong Zhuang,1998,“Why China Grew:The Role of Decentralization,”In Emergingfrom Communism: Lessons from Russia,China,and Eastern Europe,eds.Peter Boone,Stanislaw Gomulka,and Richard Layard.Cambridge:MIT Press.

Xu Chenggang,2011,“The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development,”Journal of Economic Literature 49（4）:1076-1151.

Yan Yunxiang,1996,The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village,Stanford University Press.

Yang Mayfair Mei-hui,1994,Gifts,Favors,and Banquets: the Art of Social Relationships in China,Cornell University Press.

Zhang Weiguo,1999,“Implementation of State Family Planning Programmes in a Northern Chinese Village,”The China Quarterly 157:202-230.

Zhang Xiaobo,Shenggen Fan,Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang,2004,“Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural China,”Journal of Public Economics 88（12）: 2857—2871.

Zhou Xueguang,2010,“The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China,”Modern China 36（1）:47-78.

Zhuravskaya Ekaterina V.,2000,“Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods:Fiscal Federalism,Russian Style,”Journal of Public Economics 76（3）:337-368.

中文文献

罗伯特·C.埃里克森：《无需法律的秩序：邻人如何解决纠纷》，苏力译，中国政法大学出版社2003年版。

陈硕，2010,《分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给》,《经济学》（季刊）4。

傅勇，2007,《中国式分权、地方财政模式与公共物品供给：理论与实证研究》，复旦大学博士论文。

傅勇、张晏，2007,《中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向：为增长而竞争的代价》,《管理世界》2007年第3期。

寒天主编，1999,《领导干部考察考核实用全书》，北京：中国人事出版社。

江波，2002,《体制分析与体制选择：中国第三产业中的公共服务与准公共服务》，北京：中国物资出版社。

李侃如，杨淑娟译，1998,《治理中国：从革命到改革》，台北：“国立”编译馆。

李萍主编，许宏才、李承副主编，2010,《财政体制简明图解》，北京：中国财政经济出版社。

李曙光，2000,《晚清职官法研究》，北京：中国政法大学出版社。

联合国，2000,《中国人类发展报告》。

刘嘉林、何宪主编，1990,《回避制度讲析》，北京：中国人事出版社。

刘建基，2005,《中国古代吏治札记》，社会科学文献出版社。

马大正，2002,《中国古代的边疆政策与边疆治理》,《西域研究》。

诺斯·道格拉斯，刘瑞华译，1994,《制度、制度变迁与经济成就》，台北：时报文化出版企业有限公司。

彭玉生，2009,《当正式制度与非正式规范发生冲突：计划生育与宗族网络》,《社会》2009年第1期。

平新乔、白洁，2006,《中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给》,《财贸经济》2006年第2期。

蒲坚，1990,《中国古代行政立法》，北京：北京大学出版社。

任剑涛，2010,《党权、异地任职与中央控制——从三个案例看地方治理的权力畸变与制度矫正》,《江苏社会科学》2010年第6期。

宋立、刘树杰主编，《各级政府公共服务事权财权配置》，北京：中国计划出版社2005。

孙秀林，2011,《华南的村治与宗族——一个功能主义的分析路径》,《社会学研究》2011年第1期。

汤大华、毛寿龙、宁宇、薛亮，《市政府管理：廊坊市调查》，北京：中国广播电视出版社。

唐斯·安东尼，郭小聪等译，郭小聪、李学校，2006，北京：中国人民大学出版社。

王沪宁，1991,《当代中国村落家族文化——对中国社会现代化的一项探索》，上海：上海人民出版社。

王世磊、张军，2008,《中国地方官员为什么要改善基础设施？——一个关于官员激励机制的模型》,《经济学》2008年第1期。

吴思，2009,《潜规则：中国历史中的真实游戏》，复旦大学出版社。

肖唐镖、幸珍宁，1997,《江西农村宗族情况考察》《社会学研究》1997年第4期。

谢庆奎、杨凤春、燕继荣，2005,《中国大陆政府与政治》.台北：五南图书出版股份有限公司。

溪流，2002,《中国公务员制度》，北京：清华大学出版社。

许倬云、程农、张鸣译，1998,《汉代农业：早期中国农业经济的形成》，南京：江苏人民出版社。

徐银华、石佑启、杨勇萍著，2005,《公务员法新论》，北京：北京大学出版社。

严耕望，1984,《中国地方行政制度史》台北版；安作璋、熊铁基：《秦汉官制史稿》第三编二章，齐鲁书社。

杨美惠、赵旭东、孙珉合译，张跃宏译校，2009,《礼物、关系学与国家：中国人际关系与主体性建构》，南京：江苏人民出版社。

杨仕兵，2010,《公共物品供给法律制度研究》，北京：中国检察出版社。

于建嵘、李连江，2007,《县政改革与中国政治发展》,《领导者》第十八期。

余华青主编，2007,《中国古代廉政制度史》，上海：上海人民出版社。

张厚安、徐勇、项继权等，2000,《中国农村村级治理：22个村的调查与比较》，武汉：华中师范大学出版社。

张军、高远、傅勇、张弘，2007,《中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施？》,《经济研究》2007年第3期。

钟开斌，2009,《中国中央与地方关系基本判断：一项研究综述》,《上海行政学院学报》2009年第3期。

钟雯彬，2008,《公共产品法律调整研究》，北京：法律出版社。

周平主编，2007,《当代中国地方政府》，北京：人民出版社。

《中国城市统计年鉴》

《地市县财政统计资料汇编》

《中国区域经济统计年鉴》

各省《年鉴》

《中国财政年鉴》（财政部出版社）

《中国商务年鉴》（中国商务出版社）

史书典籍

《册府元龟》卷630

《古今图书集成˙诠衡典》卷11

《后汉书˙蔡邕传》

《金史》卷五四《选举四》

《明史》卷七一《选举三》

《清通考》卷56

《日知录》卷八吏胥条

《唐会要》卷75

《文献考˙职官十七》

《续文献通考》卷四四

《元典章》卷八

《元史》卷一〇二《刑法一》

法律法规

《党政领导干部任职回避暂行规定》

《党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例》

《公务员回避规定（试行）》,2012年2月

《党政领导干部任职回避暂行规定》,http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4671268.html,《人民日报》（2006-08-07第08版）

《医疗机构管理条例》

《中共中央、国务院关于加强社会治安综合治理的决定》

《中华人民共和国地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法》

《中华人民共和国公路法》

《中华人民共和国公务员法》

《中华人民共和国环境保护法》

《中华人民共和国教育法》

《国家公务员暂行条例》1993

《关于建立国家行政机关工作人员岗位责任制的通知》1982，劳动人事部

《关于贯彻落实国务院加强环境保护重点工作文件的意见》,2012，北京市

《中华人民共和国宪法》,http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/con-tent/2004/content_62714.htm

《关于地市州党政机关机构改革若干问题的通知》,http://law.51labour.com/lawshow-40353.html

媒体资源

China Data Online（中国数据在线）: http://chinadataon-line.org/index.asp.

王汝堂：《要让农民吃得好住得好山东北大荒追梦新农村》，http://business.sohu.com/20060715/n244273418.shtml。

刘加增、魏东、李海燕：《社会主义新农村的雏形——东营统筹城乡发展的意义》,http://www.dzwww.com/xinwen/xin-wenzhuanti/xky/xg/200509/t20050908_1185543.htm。

杨进欣：《山东东营：构建农民社会保障救助体系》,http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2005-09/11/content_3474753.htm。

《石军：情倾黄河三角洲（书记市长访谈——东营篇）》,ht-tp: //www.sdtv.com.cn/lanmu/talk/benqi/200604/3962.htm。

《兰州城乡社会救助全覆盖明年低保提高 10%》,http://www.gs.xinhuanet.com/news/2007-01/17/content_9063785.htm。

《甘肃省委常委、兰州市委书记陈宝生央视细说治庸》,ht-tp: //www.tianshui.com.cn/news/lz/2006040112183157653.htm。

《陈宝生纵论治政理事》,http://www.lzbs.com.cn/rb/2006-09/12/content_875119.htm。

《PM2.5 指标将定京官员仕途，环保不达标一票否决》,ht-tp: //news.cn.yahoo.com/ypen/20120217/868803.html。

张占斌：《中国市管县体制实施25年：强县扩权陷困局》,《决策》杂志2008年1月，http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-01-28/160214845833.shtml。

瞭望新闻周刊：《公共服务差距紧逼财政改革》,http://news.163.com/05/0328/13/1FUG6VVI0001124T_2.html。

国家统计局设管司：《最新县及县以上行政区划代码（截至2011年10月31日）》,http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/xzqhdm/t20 120105_402777427.htm。