中国独立董事监督机制设计的实验研究

内容简介

独立董事制度是保证公司内部有效治理的核心机制之一。实践表明，独立董事为董事会决策提供专业意见的职能是有效的，然而，目前中国上市公司独立董事的提名、罢免和继任都受公司大股东或总经理控制，致使独立董事的实质独立性无法保证，进而导致独立董事的监督作用弱化。事实已经证明，独立董事任免及其他相关机制设计的优劣是影响独立董事监督作用以及提升上市公司治理水平的一个重要因素。

深入研究任免机制、独立性与竞争机制对中国独立董事监督作用的影响机理是提出独立董事机制改革方案和建议的前提和基础。现实中，很多独立董事与公司大股东之间存在着隐性的私人关系，这种关系较难通过公司公开数据识别。这种形式独立导致独立董事监督作用弱化，这也是利用公开数据进行公司绩效与董事会名义独立性指标相关分析得不出一致结论的重要原因之一。实验方法能够控制一些实践中不可控制的因素，并且可以检验政策实施的预期效果。因此，本书采用实验方法，在控制声誉和其他次要影响因素条件下，通过组别关系识别实质独立或形式独立的情形，对独立董事机制如何影响中国独立董事监督作用进行检验和分析，为独立董事监督机制设计及改革提供依据。

通过理论分析和实验检验，本书发现，排除其他因素影响，“实质独立”通过基于公平考虑的第三方惩罚偏好激励以保证独立董事实施有效监督；首次提名方式、组别、罢免方式和竞聘机制对独立董事的监督作用影响都是重要的。大股东独享对独立董事提名权和罢免权以及形式独立都会显著地挤出独立董事基于利他惩罚偏好的积极监督行为。中小股东独占提名权只能减弱并不能完全消除形式独立对监督作用产生的负面影响。解任方式是一个更强的影响因素，当小股东同时拥有对独立董事的提名权和解任权时，即使独立董事与内部人组别关系存在，这时组别关系的消极作用可以被降到最低。内部人独占对独立董事提名权时，竞争机制不能促进独立董事积极监督，相反会带来危害。虽然从平均水平来看，任免机制对男性与女性监督作用的影响不存在性别差异。但是，如果独立董事任免相关机制设计不当，女性实施消极监督的比例会更高。而在任免机制及其他辅助机制设计合理情况下，女性独立董事中实施有效监督的比例显著高于男性。

这些发现对独立董事机制改革的意义在于，进一步提高中小股东提名权的改革固然重要，但是罢免方式的设计应该是任免机制改革的重点。竞聘机制与外部机制需在独立董事的提名与解任（罢免）机制改革基础上实施才能起到积极作用。改进提名委员会的独立性是提高中国上市公司董事会实质独立性的重要途径之一，此外，还可以通过任免机制设计减弱形式独立对监督产生的消极影响。董事会中增加女性董事和独立董事的政策建议，也应该以先行改革任免机制为前提。

本书分为八个部分。第一部分是导论。第二部分在文献回顾和相关理论研究基础上，归纳独立董事监督的理论基础，并建立本研究的独立董事监督博弈模型。第三部分对任免机制如何影响中国独立董事的监督作用进行理论分析和模型构建。第四部分和第五部分通过两个实验对理论分析部分提出的假设进行检验。第六部分检验了任免机制对独立董事监督作用的影响是否存在性别差异。第七部分通过后续实验对整个实验设计和之前实验的效度进行检验。最后一部分概括了本书的结论，并对如何改进中国独立董事任免机制提出了建议和对策。

本书的理论价值及创新之处如下：

首先，本书提出了一种新的观点，即社会偏好理论也是独立董事监督的理论基础，利他惩罚偏好是实质独立条件下中国独立董事监督的内在激励，组别因素是形式独立削弱监督作用的深层原因。本书在Fehr和Fischbacher（2004）第三方惩罚博弈模型基础上提出独立董事监督博弈模型，较好地刻画了中国上市公司内部人、中小股东和独立董事的关系。其次，在社会偏好理论、社会同一性理论、前景理论和竞争理论基础上，阐述了任免机制通过利他、互惠、组别、损失规避及竞争因素对中国独立董事监督作用产生影响的深层机理。同时，通过社会偏好模型对博弈均衡解进行推导和求解，并创新性地构建了一个以外部机制作为外生变量，任免机制作为监督的主要影响因素，独立性作为基础影响因素的三层次理论模型，扩展了任免机制对监督作用影响的微观理论基础文献。最后，鉴于实证方法无法完美识别实质独立与形式独立，也无法比较现行机制与未施行机制的影响效果，因此，采用实验方法对任免机制如何影响中国独立董事监督作用进行研究是本书方法上的创新。

The independent director system is one of the core mechanisms to ensure effective governance within the company. Practice has shown that the function of independent directors to provide professional opinions for board decision-making is effective, however, at present, the nomination, removal and succession of independent directors of listed companies in China are controlled by the majority shareholder or general manager of the company, so that the substantive independence of independent directors cannot be guaranteed, which in turn leads to the weakening of the supervisory role of independent directors. Facts have proved that the appointment and removal of independent directors and the design of other relevant mechanisms are an important factor affecting the supervisory role of independent directors and improving the governance level of listed companies. In-depth study of the influence mechanism of appointment and dismissal mechanism, independence and competition mechanism on the supervisory role of independent directors in China is the premise and basis for putting forward the reform plan and suggestions of the independent director mechanism. In reality, many independent directors have hidden personal relationships with major shareholders of companies, which are difficult to identify through the company's public data. This form of independence leads to a weakening of the supervisory role of independent directors, which is one of the important reasons why the analysis of corporate performance and nominal independence indicators of the board of directors using public data does not reach consistent conclusions. Experimental methods can control some uncontrollable factors in practice, and can test the expected effects of policy implementation. Therefore, this book adopts experimental methods to identify the situation of substantive independence or formal independence through group relationships under the condition of controlling for reputation and other secondary influencing factors, and examines and analyzes how the independent director mechanism affects the supervision role of independent directors in China, so as to provide a basis for the design and reform of the independent director supervision mechanism. Through theoretical analysis and experimental testing, this book finds that, excluding other factors, "substantial independence" ensures effective supervision by independent directors through incentives based on fairness considerations by third-party punishment preferences; The initial nomination method, the group, the removal method and the competitive appointment mechanism are all important to the supervisory role of independent directors. The exclusive right of majority shareholders to nominate and remove independent directors, as well as formal independence, significantly crowd out the active oversight behavior of independent directors based on altruistic punishment preferences. The exclusive nomination right of minority shareholders can only weaken and cannot completely eliminate the negative impact of formal independence on the role of supervision. The method of dismissal is a stronger factor, and when minority shareholders also have the right to nominate and dismiss independent directors, the negative effect of the group relationship can be minimized, even if the independent director-insider group relationship exists. When an insider monopolizes the right to nominate independent directors, the competition mechanism cannot promote active supervision by independent directors, but will bring harm. Although on average, there is no gender difference in the impact of appointment and dismissal mechanisms on the supervisory role of men and women. However, if mechanisms for the appointment and removal of independent directors are not properly designed, the proportion of women who exercise passive oversight will be higher. However, when the appointment and removal mechanism and other auxiliary mechanisms are properly designed, the proportion of female independent directors who exercise effective supervision is significantly higher than that of men. The significance of these findings for the reform of the independent director mechanism is that although the reform to further improve the nomination power of minority shareholders is important, the design of the removal method should be the focus of the reform of the appointment and removal mechanism. The competitive and external mechanisms need to be implemented on the basis of the reform of the nomination and removal (removal) mechanism of independent directors in order to play a positive role. Improving the independence of the nomination committee is one of the important ways to enhance the substantive independence of the board of directors of Chinese listed companies, and in addition, the negative impact of formal independence on supervision can be mitigated through the design of appointment and removal mechanisms. Policy recommendations to add women and independent directors to the board should also be premised on a pre-emptive reform of the appointment and removal system. The book is divided into eight parts. The first part is the introduction. The second part summarizes the theoretical basis of independent director supervision on the basis of literature review and related theoretical research, and establishes the independent director supervision game model of this study. The third part conducts theoretical analysis and model construction on how the appointment and removal mechanism affects the supervisory role of independent directors in China. Parts IV and V test the hypotheses proposed in the theoretical analysis section through two experiments. Part VI examines whether there are gender differences in the impact of the appointment and removal mechanism on the oversight role of independent directors. Part VII examines the validity of the entire experimental design and previous experiments through subsequent experiments. The final part summarizes the conclusions of the book and puts forward suggestions and countermeasures on how to improve the appointment and removal mechanism of independent directors in China. The theoretical value and innovation of this book are as follows: First, this book puts forward a new view, that is, the theory of social preference is also the theoretical basis of independent director supervision, altruistic punishment preference is the intrinsic incentive of independent director supervision in China under the condition of substantial independence, and group factors are the deep reason why formal independence weakens the role of supervision. Based on the third-party penalty game model of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), this book proposes a model of independent director supervision game, which better describes the relationship between insiders, minority shareholders and independent directors of Chinese listed companies. Secondly, based on the theory of social preference, social identity, prospect theory and competition theory, the deep mechanism of the influence of the appointment and dismissal mechanism on the supervisory role of independent directors in China through altruism, reciprocity, grouping, loss avoidance and competition factors is expounded. At the same time, the equilibrium solution of the game is derived and solved by the social preference model, and a three-level theoretical model with the external mechanism as the exogenous variable, the appointment and removal mechanism as the main influencing factor of supervision, and the independence as the basic influencing factor is innovatively constructed, which expands the micro-theoretical basic literature on the influence of the appointment and dismissal mechanism on the role of supervision. Finally, since empirical methods cannot perfectly identify substantive independence and formal independence, nor can they compare the impact effects of existing mechanisms and non-implemented mechanisms, it is a methodological innovation in this book to use experimental methods to study how the appointment and removal mechanism affects the supervisory role of independent directors in China.（AI翻译）

作者简介

高玥（著）: 暂无简介

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